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--- qc:r._c._bellerive_2004_canlii_72984_qc_ca [2026/09/01 08:50] – victorzhou
+++ qc:r._c._bellerive_2004_canlii_72984_qc_ca [2026/09/23 17:55] (current) – victorzhou
@@ Line 53: / Line 53: @@
 [2] Essentially, the judge of the Superior Court took issue with the trial judge's failure to follow the analysis proposed by the Supreme Court in //R. v. W.(D.)//((1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742.)).
-[3] To begin, the judge of the Superior Court determined that the trial judge "[TRANSLATED] //rejected the credibility of the accused's testimony in finding, without further explanation, that his explanations could not be believed". However, a reading of the Court of Québec's judgment reveals - to the contrary - a careful consideration of the evidence admitted at trial and clear reasons based on which the trial judge concluded that the accused's testimony was not credible. He wrote, in particular:
+[3] To begin, the judge of the Superior Court determined that the trial judge "[TRANSLATED] //rejected the credibility of the accused's testimony in finding, without further explanation, that his explanations could not be believed//". However, a reading of the Court of Québec's judgment reveals - to the contrary - a careful consideration of the evidence admitted at trial and clear reasons based on which the trial judge concluded that the accused's testimony was not credible. He wrote, in particular:
 <blockquote>
@@ Line 66: / Line 66: @@
 </blockquote>
-[4] On the second issue raised by the judge of the Superior Court
+[4] As to the second issue raised by the judge of the Superior Court that the trial judge did not proceed to the other steps specified by the Supreme Court in //R. v. W.(D.)//, this was also unfounded on the first count as well as the second count. Once the trial judge completely rejected the consumption scenario and clearly stated that that he did not believe the accused, it was implicit that testimony of expert witness Rousseau which was based on this consumption scenario would become irrelevant and was implicitly rejected. The accused's spouse's testimony was subject to the same deficiencies: their general statements that their spouse normally had red cheeks and a slow gait did not affect the conclusions of the Court of Québec judge. In fact, the judge did not place any weight on the colour of the accused's cheeks and clarified that the accused's staggering gait "[TRANSLATED] that day" was caused by a large quantity of alcohol. As accurately stated by Brossard J. in //R. c. J.F.//(([1988] A.Q. n° 151, par. 13))((1998 CanLII 12451 (QC CA) )):
+<blockquote>
+[TRANSLATION] //First, it must be recalled that we are not dealing with jury instructions but rather with a verdict pronounced by judge alone whose experience and knowledge of what constitutes reasonable doubt are not called into question in this case. In this context, care must be taken to not solely and absolutely rely on the ordering suggested by the Supreme Court in the decision above [i.e. W(D)]. Rather, it is presumed that the first judge considered the judgments of the superior courts in their evaluation of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, even when they do not explain their reasons in a formal way or in an established order. It is only when it is manifestly obvious that the conclusions that the trial judge first drew from their evaluation of the credibility of the Crown's evidence prevents them from effectively and objectively appreciating reasonable doubts that the defence's evidence nevertheless raises... that there is room for this Court of intervene against the conclusions of the first master of the evaluation of the evidence.//
+</blockquote>
+[5] In light of these reasons, the appeal should be allowed and the judgment of the judge of the Court of Québec is reinstated.
+[6] As a consequence, the Court:
+[7] **ALLOWS** the appeal;
+[8] **OVERTURNS** the judgment of the Superior Court pronounced on July 24, 2003;
+[9] **REINSTATES** the guilty verdicts pronounced by the judge of first instance; and
+[10] **ENTERS** a conditional stay of procedures on the first count.
+%%_____________________%% \\
+**JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN, J.C.A.**
+%%_____________________%% \\
+**LOUISE OTIS, J.C.A.**
+%%_____________________%% \\
+**FRANCE THIBAULT, J.C.A.**