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--- qc:r._c._bellerive_2004_canlii_72984_qc_ca [2026/09/23 17:51] – victorzhou
+++ qc:r._c._bellerive_2004_canlii_72984_qc_ca [2026/09/23 17:55] (current) – victorzhou
@@ Line 66: / Line 66: @@
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-[4] As to the second issue raised by the judge of the Superior Court that the trial judge did not proceed to the other steps specified by the Supreme Court in //R. v. W.(D.)//, this was also unfounded on the first count as well as the second count. Once the trial judge completely rejected the consumption scenario and clearly stated that that he did not believe the accused, it was implicit that testimony of expert witness Rousseau which was based on this consumption scenario would become irrelevant and was implicitly rejected. The accused's spouse's testimony was subject to the same deficiencies: their general statements that their spouse normally had red cheeks and a slow gait did not affect the conclusions of the Court of Québec judge. In fact, the judge did not place any weight on the colour of the accused's cheeks and clarified that the accused's staggering gait "[TRANSLATED] that day" was caused by a large quantity of alcohol. As accurately stated by Brossard J. in //R. c. J.F.//(([1988] A.Q. n° 151, par. 13)):
+[4] As to the second issue raised by the judge of the Superior Court that the trial judge did not proceed to the other steps specified by the Supreme Court in //R. v. W.(D.)//, this was also unfounded on the first count as well as the second count. Once the trial judge completely rejected the consumption scenario and clearly stated that that he did not believe the accused, it was implicit that testimony of expert witness Rousseau which was based on this consumption scenario would become irrelevant and was implicitly rejected. The accused's spouse's testimony was subject to the same deficiencies: their general statements that their spouse normally had red cheeks and a slow gait did not affect the conclusions of the Court of Québec judge. In fact, the judge did not place any weight on the colour of the accused's cheeks and clarified that the accused's staggering gait "[TRANSLATED] that day" was caused by a large quantity of alcohol. As accurately stated by Brossard J. in //R. c. J.F.//(([1988] A.Q. n° 151, par. 13))((1998 CanLII 12451 (QC CA) )):
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-[TRANSLATION]] //First, it must be recalled that we are not dealing with jury instructions but rather with a verdict pronounced by judge alone whose experience and knowledge of what constitutes reasonable doubt are not called into question in this case. In this context, care must be taken to not solely and absolutely rely on the ordering suggested by the Supreme Court in the decision above [i.e. W(D)]. Rather, it is presumed that the first judge considered the judgments of the superior courts in their evaluation of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, even when they do not explain their reasons in a formal way or in an established order. It is only when it is manifestly obvious that the conclusions that the trial judge first drew from their evaluation of the credibility of the Crown's evidence prevents them from effectively and objectively appreciating reasonable doubts that the defence's evidence nevertheless raises... that there is room for this Court of intervene against the conclusions of the first master of the evaluation of the evidence.//
+[TRANSLATION] //First, it must be recalled that we are not dealing with jury instructions but rather with a verdict pronounced by judge alone whose experience and knowledge of what constitutes reasonable doubt are not called into question in this case. In this context, care must be taken to not solely and absolutely rely on the ordering suggested by the Supreme Court in the decision above [i.e. W(D)]. Rather, it is presumed that the first judge considered the judgments of the superior courts in their evaluation of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, even when they do not explain their reasons in a formal way or in an established order. It is only when it is manifestly obvious that the conclusions that the trial judge first drew from their evaluation of the credibility of the Crown's evidence prevents them from effectively and objectively appreciating reasonable doubts that the defence's evidence nevertheless raises... that there is room for this Court of intervene against the conclusions of the first master of the evaluation of the evidence.//
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