sk:r_c._desmeules_2026_skkb_86
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| sk:r_c._desmeules_2026_skkb_86 [2026/08/05 00:11] – victorzhou | sk:r_c._desmeules_2026_skkb_86 [2026/08/05 01:19] (current) – victorzhou | ||
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| ====== R c. Desmeules, 2026 SKKB 86 (CanLII) ====== | ====== R c. Desmeules, 2026 SKKB 86 (CanLII) ====== | ||
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| + | Original Source: [[https:// | ||
| ===== COURT OF KING'S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN ===== | ===== COURT OF KING'S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN ===== | ||
| Line 55: | Line 57: | ||
| [6] Two witnesses testified at trial: officer Arnaldo Fortugno for the Crown and Mr. Desmeules in his own defence. | [6] Two witnesses testified at trial: officer Arnaldo Fortugno for the Crown and Mr. Desmeules in his own defence. | ||
| - | [7] Officer Fortugno testified that he had been an officer for 22 years. On July 6, 2021, he and his colleague were conducting driver seatbelt and cellphone checks on Idylwyld Drive in Saskatoon. Because it was nice outside, officer Fortugno was patrolling on foot. He observed Mr. Desmeules driving his vehicle, a RAV4, 15 metres away. He confirmed that Idylwyld Drive is a public road. | + | [7] Officer Fortugno testified that he had been an officer for 22 years. On July 6, 2021, he and his colleague were conducting driver seatbelt and cellphone checks on Idylwyld Drive in Saskatoon. Because it was nice outside, officer Fortugno was patrolling on foot. He observed Mr. Desmeules driving his vehicle, a RAV4, 15 metres away. He confirmed that Idylwyld Drive is a highway. |
| [8] Officer Fortugno testified that while he was monitoring southbound traffic on Idylwyld, he noticed Mr. Desmeules in his vehicle, a RAV4. Officer Fortugno looked inside the RAV4 through the passenger window. He noted that Mr. Desmeules was holding a cellphone in his right hand with the screen facing him. He clarified that Mr. Desmeules was holding the phone between his fingers and that the screen was lit. After making these observations, | [8] Officer Fortugno testified that while he was monitoring southbound traffic on Idylwyld, he noticed Mr. Desmeules in his vehicle, a RAV4. Officer Fortugno looked inside the RAV4 through the passenger window. He noted that Mr. Desmeules was holding a cellphone in his right hand with the screen facing him. He clarified that Mr. Desmeules was holding the phone between his fingers and that the screen was lit. After making these observations, | ||
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| [16] The trial judge first considered the details of the offence that Mr. Desmeules was convicted of. He then examined s. 241.1(2) of the //Act// and noted that the definition of " | [16] The trial judge first considered the details of the offence that Mr. Desmeules was convicted of. He then examined s. 241.1(2) of the //Act// and noted that the definition of " | ||
| - | [17] Regarding the evidence of the //Act// infraction, the trial judge concluded that officer Arnaldo Fortugno' | + | [17] Regarding the evidence of the //Act// infraction, the trial judge concluded that officer Arnaldo Fortugno' |
| - | [18] The trial judge considered three decisions of the Municipal Court of Quebec that Mr. Desmeules relied on and found that they did not apply in this case. He concluded that the Crown had proved the commission of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. | + | [18] The trial judge considered three decisions of the municipal courts |
| [19] Next, the trial judge turned to the defence of due diligence as interpreted by the Supreme Court in //R v Sault Ste. Marie//, 1978 CanLII 11, [1978] 2 SCR 1299 [//Sault Ste. Marie//]. He also considered the elements of the defence of the necessity, referring to //R v Latimer//, 2001 SCC 1 [// | [19] Next, the trial judge turned to the defence of due diligence as interpreted by the Supreme Court in //R v Sault Ste. Marie//, 1978 CanLII 11, [1978] 2 SCR 1299 [//Sault Ste. Marie//]. He also considered the elements of the defence of the necessity, referring to //R v Latimer//, 2001 SCC 1 [// | ||
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| ==== VI. Analyis ==== | ==== VI. Analyis ==== | ||
| - | |||
| === The offence of holding a cellphone while driving === | === The offence of holding a cellphone while driving === | ||
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| **241.1**(1) In this section and in section 287: | **241.1**(1) In this section and in section 287: | ||
| - | * (a) __" | + | * (a) __" |
| - | * (b) " | + | * (b) "make a phone call" means to make, answer or end a phone call, or to transmit or receive voice communication; |
| - | transmit or receive voice communication; | + | |
| * %%(c)%% " | * %%(c)%% " | ||
| * (d) " | * (d) " | ||
| Line 122: | Line 122: | ||
| (2) __No driver shall hold, view, use or manipulate electronic communications equipment while driving a motor vehicle on a highway.__ | (2) __No driver shall hold, view, use or manipulate electronic communications equipment while driving a motor vehicle on a highway.__ | ||
| - | (2.1) Every person who contravenes subsection (2) is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction: | + | (2.1) Every person who contravenes subsection (2) is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction: |
| * (a) to a fine of not more than $500 for a first offence; | * (a) to a fine of not more than $500 for a first offence; | ||
| * (b) in the case of a second conviction in a 12-month period for an offence pursuant to this section, to a fine of not more than $1,000; and | * (b) in the case of a second conviction in a 12-month period for an offence pursuant to this section, to a fine of not more than $1,000; and | ||
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| (3) Subsection (2) does not apply to: | (3) Subsection (2) does not apply to: | ||
| * (a) a driver who is not a new driver and who, while driving a motor vehicle on a highway: | * (a) a driver who is not a new driver and who, while driving a motor vehicle on a highway: | ||
| - | * (i) activates the electronic communications equipment to make a phone call by pressing a button once on the electronic communications equipment, or on a device that is linked to electronic communications equipment, and does not hold the electronic communications equipment; or | + | * (i) activates the electronic communications equipment to make a phone call by pressing a button once on the electronic communications equipment, or on a device that is linked to electronic communications equipment, and does not hold the electronic communications equipment; or |
| * (ii) utilizes his or her voice to activate electronic communications equipment to make a phone call and does not hold the electronic communications equipment; | * (ii) utilizes his or her voice to activate electronic communications equipment to make a phone call and does not hold the electronic communications equipment; | ||
| * (b) a driver if the driver is using electronic communications equipment to report an emergency to a police service, a fire department or emergency medical services or to request an ambulance; | * (b) a driver if the driver is using electronic communications equipment to report an emergency to a police service, a fire department or emergency medical services or to request an ambulance; | ||
| - | * %%(c)%% a prescribed person or prescribed class of persons; or | + | * %%(c)%% a prescribed person or prescribed class of persons; or |
| - | * (d) a prescribed vehicle or prescribed class of vehicles. | + | * (d) a prescribed vehicle or prescribed class of vehicles. |
| </ | </ | ||
| [Underlines added by appeal judge.] | [Underlines added by appeal judge.] | ||
| + | [29] In //R v Kazemi//, 2013 ONCA 585 at para. 14 [// | ||
| + | |||
| + | < | ||
| + | [1] The facts of this case are simple. On April 26, 2010, the respondent was driving home from work alone. While she was stopped at a stop light, a police officer observed her to have a cellphone in her hand. She said that the cellphone had been on the seat but had dropped to the floor of the car when she braked. She picked it up when she got to the red light. That was when she was observed by the officer. | ||
| + | </ | ||
| + | |||
| + | [30] The main question was whether Ms. Kazemi was " | ||
| + | |||
| + | [31] In the appeal at the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the Court held that the correct interpretation of the expression " | ||
| + | |||
| + | [32] In //Kazemi// at para. 14, the Court of Appeal found that the objective of the law was to completely prohibit holding a cellphone while driving to prevent distracted driving and thus increase public safety: | ||
| + | |||
| + | < | ||
| + | [14] Road safety is best ensured by a complete prohibition on having a cellphone in one's hand at all while driving. A complete prohibition also best focuses a driver' | ||
| + | </ | ||
| + | |||
| + | [33] //Kazemi// was cited with approval in //Lukic v R//, 2021 SKQB 221 [// | ||
| + | |||
| + | [34] The offence proscribed by s. 241.1(2), holding a cellphone while driving, is a strict liability offence. To establish that Mr. Desmeules is guilty of this offence, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Desmeules committed the prohibited act (//actus reus//), specifically the following elements: | ||
| + | |||
| + | * (a) Mr. Desmeules was the driver of a motor vehicle; | ||
| + | * (b) He was driving on a highway; | ||
| + | * (c) While he was driving, he was holding, looking at, using or manipulating a cellphone. | ||
| + | |||
| + | |||
| + | [35] Mr. Desmeules' | ||
| + | |||
| + | [36] In short, the facts of this case are as simple as the facts in //Kazemi//. On July 6, 2021 at 2:45 PM, Mr. Desmeules was driving a vehicle on Idylwyld Drive in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. Idylwyld Drive is a " | ||
| + | |||
| + | [37] At trial and on appeal, Mr. Desmeules relies on three decisions of the municipal courts of Quebec: //Ville de Saint-Jérôme c Noël//, 2019 QCCM 61 [// | ||
| + | |||
| + | < | ||
| + | [TRANSLATED] | ||
| + | |||
| + | [16] For the purposes of this case, the Court makes three findings on the interpretation of this law: | ||
| + | |||
| + | 16.1 It is permitted to have a telephone conversation while using a cellphone and driving a vehicle, as long as the cellphone is in " | ||
| + | |||
| + | 16.2 It is permitted, while driving, to look at the information on a display screen, including on a portable device, as long as (1) the device only shows information pertinent to the driving of the vehicle or the functionality of its devices, (2) the screen is integrated with the vehicle or placed on a support, either stationary or move-able, attached to the vehicle, and (3) the device as attached in a secure way. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 16.3 It is permitted, while driving, to activate a function on a display screen on the same conditions enumerated by paragraph 16.2 above. | ||
| + | </ | ||
| + | |||
| + | [38] The law under review does not allow the driver to look at their cellphone' | ||
| + | |||
| + | [39] Second, in each of these cases, the accused was acquitted because they were using a map application in conformity with the law/or because they were having a conversation in hands-free mode. None of the accused were holding the phone in their hand. | ||
| + | |||
| + | [40] In the case at bar, the Justice of the Peace committed no error in finding that the Crown had proved the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. | ||
| + | |||
| + | === The defences of necessity and due diligence === | ||
| + | |||
| + | [41] Mr. Desmeules argues that the trial judge committed an error by failing to find the defences of necessity and impossibility. | ||
| + | |||
| + | [42] The state of necessity can be used as a defence against a regulatory violation of a provincial law, such as the //Act//, in the same way as against criminal offences: //R v Brennan//, 1989 CanLII 7169, 52 CCC (3d) 366 (ONCA); and //R v Kurtzman//, 1991 CanLII 7059, 66 CCC (3d) 161 (ONCA). | ||
| + | |||
| + | [43] The elements required to establish the defence of necessity are the following (// | ||
| + | |||
| + | (a) There must be an imminent peril or danger; | ||
| + | (b) The accused must have had no reasonable legal alternative to the course of action he or she undertook; and | ||
| + | (c) There must be proportionality between the harm inflicted and the harm avoided. | ||
| + | |||
| + | [44] When sufficient evidence is placed before the court that raises the defence of necessity, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused' | ||
| + | |||
| + | [45] The decision in //Toronto (City) v Russo//, 2024 ONCJ 476, illustrates the application of the defence of necessity to a highway offence involving the use of a cellphone. Mr. Russo, the driver of the vehicle, was stopped in the left-hand turn land at an intersection. He was diabetic and received an alert on his cellphone from an implant in his arm. He took his cellphone out, opened an application and held the phone in his arms. An officer witnessed these actions and indicated for him to pull over. Mr. Russo explained that his blood sugar level were low and he needed to take his medicine. The Justice of the Peace concluded that there were signs of a clear and imminent danger for Mr. Russo' | ||
| + | |||
| + | [46] The defence of impossibility is encompassed by the defence of due diligence: //R v Cobalt Construction Inc.//, 2018 YKSC 36 at paras. 47-55; //Mount Polley Mining Corporation v Environmental Appeal Board//, 2022 BCSC 1483 at paras. 62-63. To establish this defence, the defendant must provide evidence of their due diligence. They must demonstrate, | ||
| + | |||
| + | [47] In the case at bar, the trial judge correctly identified the constitutive elements of the defence of necessity. They then concluded that they were not convinced, on a balance of probabilities, | ||
| + | |||
| + | [48] The trial judge also found that Mr. Desmeules failed to establish the defence of due diligence. They noted that Mr. Desmeules could have taken precautions to prevent his phone from falling to the floor. The judge remarked that the defendant could have placed his phone in a secure place, like a pocket or a storage area. Thus, the judge rejected the defence of due diligence. | ||
| + | |||
| + | [49] In my view, the trial judge could have made a clearer distinction between the defences of due diligence and necessity in his application of the law to the facts of the case at bar. Despite this lack of precision, the judge clearly concluded that Mr. Desmeules failed to show, on a balance of probabilities, | ||
| + | |||
| + | [50] Additionally, | ||
| + | |||
| + | [51] For these reasons, I find that the trial judge' | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==== VII. Conclusion ==== | ||
| + | |||
| + | [52] For these reasons, the appeal is rejected. | ||
| + | __%%_________%%J.__ \\ | ||
| + | P.T. BERGBUSCH | ||
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