supreme_court_of_british_columbia:r._c._abdullah_2024_bcsc_749
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| - | ====== R. c. Abdullah, 2024 BCSC 749 ====== | ||
| - | Original Source: [[https:// | ||
| - | ---- | ||
| - | **SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA** | ||
| - | Citation: //R. c. Abdullah//, 2024 BCSC 749 | ||
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| - | Date: 20240501 \\ | ||
| - | Docket: X084318 \\ | ||
| - | Registry: New Westminster | ||
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| - | **Rex** | ||
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| - | v. | ||
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| - | **Loukman Abdullah** | ||
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| - | Before the Honourable Justice Edelmann | ||
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| - | **Reasons for Judgment - s. 24(2)** | ||
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| - | Counsel for the Crown: E. Rouleau; M.B. Rankin, K.C. | ||
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| - | Counsel for the Accused: S. Mandanici; T.M. Arbogast, K.C. | ||
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| - | Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, BC; March 11, 12 and 14, 2024 | ||
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| - | Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, BC; May 1, 2024 | ||
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| - | **__Introduction__** | ||
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| - | [1] Mr. Abdullah is charged with the possession of firearms. In the present motion, he seeks the exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) of the //Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms//. In February, I issued my decision regarding certain alleged breaches. In particular, I concluded that the initial search of Mr. Abdullah during the stop was a violation of his section 8 //Charter// rights. The parties proceeded to make submissions on the application of section 24(2). | ||
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| - | [2] The Supreme Court of Canada recently summarized the relevant analysis under s. 24(2) in //R. v. Tim//, 2022 SCC 12: | ||
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| - | [74] Section 24(2) of the Charter is triggered where evidence is " | ||
| - | </ | ||
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| - | [3] I begin with a general overview of the interaction between Mr. Abdullah and the officers during the stop, search and eventual arrest. I continue with the issues most relevant to the analysis under s. 24(2). | ||
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| - | **__Facts__** | ||
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| - | [4] On February 25, 2022 at around 11:18 PM, Constables Hall and Branchaud, members of the Surrey Gang Enforcement Team, were on patrol in the city of Surrey in an unmarked vehicle. The Gang Enforcement Team's mission is to increase public safety by removing gang members and violent individuals from the public. They also focus on drug, human and weapon trafficking. | ||
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| - | [5] The officers were stopped at the intersection of Old Yale Road and 132nd Street when they observed a Jeep Grand Cherokee nearly leave the roadway before turning left in front of them. Cst. Hall, who was driving, made a U-turn to folllow the vehicle. Cst. Branchaud, who was in the passenger seat, estimates that it took 20 seconds to make the U-turn and approach the rear of the vehicle to read the license plate. | ||
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| - | [6] Cst. Branchaud conducted a search of the plate. He learned that the Jeep was registered in Quebec to Loukman Abdullah, who had been prohibited from possessing firearms since 2018 and was required to have an immobilizer installed in his vehicle. He relayed this information to Cst. Hall. | ||
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| - | [7] Cst. Hall judged that the vehicle was exceeding the speed limit while following it but did not note the speed indicated on his own speedometer. He followed the vehicle for between four to six minutes before activating his police lights and stopping the vehicle near the intersection of Fraser Highway and 138th Street. He said that it took six minutes to effectuate the stop because he had to catch up to the vehicle then find an appropriate location for the stop. | ||
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| - | [8] The two officers exited their vehicle. Cst. Hall approached the driver side of the Jeep and Cst. Branchaud approached the passenger side. The Jeep had two occupants. The driver Mr. Abdullah was an Arab man of average height and the passenger Mali Jean was a tall, black man with long dreadlocks. The officers noted that the pair both had freshly-lit cigarettes. | ||
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| - | [9] Cst. Hall said that he informed the driver, in English, of the reason for the stop and asked for his driver' | ||
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| - | [10] At the same time, Cst. Branchaud had a conversation in French with the passenger. Cst. Branchaud asked Mr. Jean why they were there and where they were going. Cst. Branchaud saw the driver look at him and then the officer asked Mr. Abdullah whether he spoke French. Mr. Abdullah responded in the affirmative. | ||
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| - | [11] According to Cst. Branchaud, he asked some questions to determine why Mr. Abdullah was in British Columbia. He then asked other questions about their plans on the night in question. He did not take any notes on the details of the questions and answers and the Crown accepts that his memory was not very good in this area. In particular, Cst. Branchaud recalls that Mr. Abdullah said that he lived in Burnaby and was going to see a friend in Surrey. Mr. Jean and Mr. Abdullah both testified that it was Mr. Jean who had been living in Burnaby for several years. Mr. Abdullah had recently arrived from Quebec and was staying with his uncle in Surrey. He picked Mr. Jean up from Burnaby that evening to go to Surrey together to visit some friends. The officers were of the view that the answers were evasive. | ||
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| - | [12] Cst. Branchaud said that he then told the occupants that their nervousness "made him nervous" | ||
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| - | [13] Cst. Hall's version of events was remarkably different from that of Cst. Branchaud. Cst. Hall did not understand anything said in French but noted that during the interaction, | ||
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| - | [14] Cst. Hall said that he and Cst. Branchaud then had a discussion, during which they decided to conduct a brief safety search based on Cst. Hall's belief that their was something concealed in Mr. Abdullah' | ||
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| - | [15] Initially, Cst. Branchaud said that there was no conversation with his partner about a safety search before ordering it. When it was put to Cst. Hall that there was a conversation, | ||
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| - | [16] In my decision on the alleged breaches, I concluded that Cst. Hall had not seen the object in Mr. Abdullah' | ||
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| - | [17] Cst. Branchaud informed the two occupants in French that they were being detained for officer safety and ordered them to exit the vehicle. They cooperated with the order. Cst. Hall conducted the search of Mr. Abdullah on the driver' | ||
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| - | **__State conduct__** | ||
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| - | **Stop and interrogation** | ||
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| - | [18] Each officer testified to independently finding necessary grounds to initiate a search of the occupants. The Crown does not rely on the grounds expressed by Cst. Branchaud to justify the search and I conclude that they were not sufficient for more or less the same reasons I came to this conclusion on Cst. Hall's grounds. Before continuing with the issue of state conduct, it seems appropriate to me to more closely examine the context of the interaction between Cst. Branchaud and the occupants of the vehicle. | ||
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| - | [19] Given that the vehicle nearly left the roadway, I accept the parties' | ||
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| - | [20] On the other hand, I am not convinced that the main reason for the stop was to conduct an inquiry into the sobriety of the driver. If the main reason for the stop was the near-incident, | ||
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| - | [21] The fact that the officers had another reason to stop a vehicle does not necessarily render a road stop arbitrary (R. v. Kaddoura, 2009 BCCA 113). However, the police power to stop a vehicle for road safety reasons does not confer upon them the right to interrogate the occupants or the right to search the vehicle to prove the commission of other offenses (R. v. Kaddoura, 2009 BCCA 113 at para. 18 and R. v. Mellenthin, 1992 CanLII 50 (SCC), [1992] 3 SCR 615). | ||
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| - | [22] It seems more likely to me that it was only after they obtained the information from the computer that they decided to stop the vehicle. Mr. Abdullah had a criminal record and was subject to a firearms prohibition. At least for Cst. Branchaud, these were the principle concerns. The road stop presented them an opportunity to investigate the occupants of the vehicle and their activities. From the start of the investigation, | ||
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| - | [23] Notably, neither of the officers were interested in the presence of an immobilizer in Mr. Abdullah' | ||
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| - | [24] It is not clear whether Cst. Branchaud understood that the occupants of the vehicle were detained when they were being interrogated. In particular, he alleged that the passenger was free to leave or refuse to answer the questions even though he was clear that no one informed him of these rights. When an officer was outside the door of the vehicle and asking him questions, it is difficult to see how the passenger could have had the impression that he could leave. | ||
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| - | [25] Similarly, even if Cst. Branchaud alleges that the passenger could have refused to answer the questions, he was of the view that Mr. Abdullah had to asnswer as the driver by virtue of the highway code (//Motor Vehicle Act//). Cst. Branchaud' | ||
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| - | [26] More importantly, | ||
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| - | [27] Other than the initial grounds for the stop, Mr. Abdullah' | ||
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| - | It has been seen that as a result of the check stop the appellant was detained. The arbitrary detention was imposed as soon as he was pulled over. As a result of that detention, it can reasonably be inferred that the appellant felt compelled to respond to questions put to him by the police officer. In those circumstances it is incumbent upon the Crown to adduce evidence that the person detained had indeed made an informed consent to the search based upon an awareness of his rights to refuse to respond to the questions or to consent to the search. There is no such evidence in this case. In my view the trial judge was correct in her conclusion that the appellant felt compelled to respond to the police questions. In the circumstances it cannot be said that the search was consensual. | ||
| - | </ | ||
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| - | [28] I am conscious of the distinction highlighted by the Court of Appeal in // | ||
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| - | [29] According to Cst. Branchaud, the so-called evasive answers formed the basis for the search. It is clear that Mr. Abdullah was detained during Cst. Branchaud' | ||
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| - | [30] He clearly stated that the question of sobriety was for Cst. Hall. Cst. Branchaud did not know the state of Cst. Hall's investigation when he ordered the search of the occupants of the vehicle. Considering Cst. Branchaud' | ||
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| - | **Cst. Hall's testimony** | ||
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| - | [31] During his testimony, Cst. Hall placed emphasis on the driver' | ||
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| - | [32] As noted by the court in //R. v. Harrison//, 2009 SCC 34 | ||
| - | < | ||
| - | [26] While not part of the Charter breach itself, this is properly a factor to consider as part of the first inquiry under the s. 24(2) analysis given the need for a court to dissociate itself from such behaviour. As Cronk J.A. observed, "the integrity of the judicial system and the truth-seeking function of the courts lie at the heart of the admissibility inquiry envisaged under s. 24(2) of the Charter. Few actions more directly undermine both of these goals than misleading testimony in court from persons in authority" | ||
| - | </ | ||
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| - | **The search of Mr. Abdullah** | ||
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| - | [33] For the reasons set out above, I conclude that a major motivation for the stop of Mr. Abdullah' | ||
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| - | **__Impact on Mr. Abdullah' | ||
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| - | [34] As noted in //R. v. Harrison//, 2009 SCC 34, being stopped and searched by the police without justification has a real impact on his legitimate expectations of liberty and privacy. Even though the stop of Mr. Abdullah was initially justified, he was then subjected to an interrogation and a search of his person which were not justified. Like the court in Harrison, I conclude that deprivation of liberty and privacy which occurred during the unconstitutional interrogation and search constitutes a serious infringement, | ||
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| - | [35] I have heard detailed submissions on the application of //R. v. Zacharias//, | ||
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| - | **__Interest in the adjudication of the case on the merits__** | ||
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| - | [36] Possession of firearms poses a real danger in the Greater Vancouver region. There is no question that the public has a marked interest in that the matter be decided on the merits. The evidence on file is reliable and it seems that there is little question that Mr. Abdullah was in possession of the weapon in question, despite his own testimony. | ||
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| - | **__Conclusion__** | ||
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| - | [37] Using a stop that would otherwise be justified as pretext to interrogate and search the occupants of a vehicle is not only an attack on the rights of the targetted individuals but would also undermine the respect of the public of necessary police actions to ensure road safety. Furthemore, the officers failed to present their different motivations frankly before the court so that it could play its constitutional role. | ||
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| - | [W]hile the public has a heightened interest in seeing a determination on the merits where the offence charged is serious, the public also has a vital interest in a justice system that is beyond reproach, particularly where the penal stakes for the accused are high. (// | ||
| - | </ | ||
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| - | [38] In consideration of the facts and the factors in their entirety, I conclude that the usage of the obtained evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. | ||
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| - | " | ||
