====== Laliberté c. R., 2026 QCCA 1112 ======
Original Source: //Laliberté c. R.//, 2026 QCCA 1112 (CanLII), <[[https://canlii.ca/t/kmpb6]]>, retrieved on 2026-08-31.
----
**Laliberté c. R.** \\
**2026 QCCA 1112**
===== COURT OF APPEAL =====
CANADA
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
MONTREAL
No: 500-10-700150-244 (505-01-181618-220)
DATE: August 19, 2026
| **DIVISION: THE HONOURABLE** | **MANON SAVARD, J.C.A.** |
| | **GUY COURNOYER, J.C.A.** |
| | **PETER KALICHMAN, J.C.A.** |
**HANS LALIBERTÉ** \\
APPELLANT - accused
v.
**HIS MAJESTY THE KING** \\
RESPONDENT - prosecution
REASONS
**__WARNING__: A publication ban order was pronounced at trial under s. 484.4(1) //Cr.C.// restricting the publication or transmission in any way of evidence that could identify the victim or witnesses.**
[1] Following a trial involving contradictory versions of events from the complainant and the appellant, the latter was found guilty of sexual touching of a minor under 16 years old (s. 151(a) //Cr.C.//, count 1 as modified), voyeurism (s. 162(1)(a) //Cr.C.//, count 4) and sexual assault (s. 271(a) //Cr.C.//, count 7)((//R. c. Laliberté//, 2024 QCCQ 13995 [Judgment under appeal])).
[2] The complainant was between 9 and 12 years old((The trial judge indicated that the complainant was between 11 and 13 years old during the events. This discrepancy on the child's age is not relevant to the grounds of appeal.)) during the period covered by the charged offences: July 1, 2014 to March 1, 2017. At trial, she testified that the appellant, who was her mother's spouse during this time, touched her in a changing room, surreptitiously watched her in the shower multiple times and penetrated her vagina on one occasion in their apartment's kitchen. She was unable to precisely place the events in time. The trial judge accepted the complainant's testimony, finding her credible and reliable, and rejected the appellant's denial.
[3] The appellant raises several overlapping grounds of appeal which can be grouped into two categories: (1) the trial judge committed palpable and overriding errors in his evaluation of the evidence and his factual findings; (2) the trial judge committed errors of law and fact in his evaluation of the appellant's denial.
* * *
[4] Given the applicable standard of review((//R. v. Kruk//, 2024 SCC 7, para. 81-85 [//Kruk//])), this Court finds that the appellant has not raised any reviewable errors in the evaluation of the evidence in regards to the following aspects: (1) the absence of the opportunity to commit the touching in the changing room; (2) his denial of going to the school to look for the complainant alone; (3) the contradictory testimony of the complainant on the nature of the touching she experienced.
[5] First, the trial judge did not infer, as the appellant submits, the it was during a "[TRANSLATED] family" shopping trip, which he acknowledged participating in, that he had the opportunity to commit the alleged touching. Rather, he wrote the he could not rule out this possibility. In any case, at the end of his analysis, he relied more on the testimony of the complainant who also stated that she went shopping alone with the appellant. Therfore, the trial judge's finding does not lack a factual foundation.
[6] Next, even if the trial judge erred in focusing on the appellant's usage of the words that he did not have "[TRANSLATED] any memory" of going to the school to look for the complainant alone, as she testified, the appellant has not demonstrated how this was determinative in the trial judge's reasoning.
[7] Finally, the fact that the complainant had indicated to officers that the appellant had touched her breasts over clothing but at trial, she could only remember that one occasion when the appellant touched her breasts, his want was under her clothing, is not determinative to undermine the trial judge's finding on the reliability of the complainant's testimony.
* * *
[8] However, the issue of the evaluation of the appellant's denial is different given the trial judge's reasons for rejecting them.
[9] Before considering this issue, it would be helpful to succinctly summarize certain basic principles.
[10] First, according to //G.F.//, "[a]ppellate courts must not finely parse the trial judge’s reasons in a search for error"((//R. v. G.F.//, 2021 SCC 20, para. 69 [//G.F.//].)). They must be "read as a whole, in the context of the evidence, the issues and the arguments at trial"((//R. v. Chung//, 2020 SCC 8, para. 13, citing //R. v. Laboucan//, 2010 SCC 12, para. 16, citing //R. v. R.E.M.//, 2008 SCC 51, para. 16 [//R.E.M.//].)) Additionally, it is not sufficient to conclude that the trial judge "expressed themselves poorly"((//G.F., supra//, note 4, para. 71.)) or that they "may or might have erred"((//G.F., supra//, note 4, para. 79.)) to justify appellate intervention.
[11] Similarly, "[w]here ambiguities in a trial judge’s reasons are open to multiple interpretations, those that are consistent with the presumption of correct application must be preferred over those that suggest error"((//G.F.//, supra, note 4, para. 79.)).
[12] However, "the presumption that trial judges are presumed to know the law with which they work on a day-in day-out basis does not negate the need for reasons to show that the law is correctly applied in the particular case"((//R.E.M., supra//, note 5, para. 47; //Foomani c. R.//, 2023 QCCA 232, para. 67 [//Foomani//].)). Therefore, even if the trial judge instructed themself correctly on the law, their reasons may reveal that they committed an error in the application of the law, since "[a] judge who knows the law may still make mistakes in a particular case"((//R. v. Sheppard//, 2002 CSC 26, para. 54.)).
[13] Since "the reasons proffered by the trial judge in support of his decision are presumed to reflect the reasoning that led him to his decision"((//R. v. Teskey//, 2007 CSC 25, para. 19.)), a court of appeal "[TRANSLATED] may not set aside the explicit reasons of the trial judge"((//Lessard c. R.//, 2022 QCCA 1396, para. 47.)) or "[TRANSLATED] ignore what is written when the trial judge expresses themself unambiguously"((//Fort Théagène c. R.//, 2021 QCCA 637, para. 45.)).
[14] An accused's general denial of the facts of an accusation may certainly be rejected in whole or in part but the trial judge must explain the reasons why the accused was found to be not credible or why the denial was rejected in the context of the file((//Foomani, supra//, note 9, para. 100-101.)).
[15] In this rehard, in //Berg//((//R. v. Berg//, 2026 CSC 21 [//Berg//].)), the Supreme Court recently commented that //J.J.R.D.//((//R. v. J.J.R.D.// (2006) 2006 CanLII 40088 (ON CA), 215 C.C.C. (3d) 252 (C.A. Ont.).)) of the Court of Appeal of Ontario "may mislead the trier of fact to think that they may reject the accused's account solely based on a 'considered and reasoned' acceptance of the complainant’s testimony"((//Berg, supra//, note 15, para. 10.)).
[16] On this topic, the Supreme Court explained((//Berg, supra//, note 15, para. 11.)):
[11] Instead, __a conviction must always rest on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And proof beyond a reasonable doubt demands more than a "considered and reasoned acceptance" of the complainant’s evidence__. Indeed, in //J.J.R.D.//, Doherty J.A. was characteristically careful in his formulation: a trial judge can reject an accused’s evidence “based on a considered and reasoned acceptance __beyond a reasonable doubt__ of the truth of conflicting credible evidence” (para. 53 (emphasis added)). Read in full, this passage maintains that appellate courts should ensure that trial judges have considered the conflicting evidence — whether it is only the complainant’s testimony or also includes circumstantial evidence — __and explained why it meets the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt__. It is not, by contrast, an invitation for trial judges to enter convictions __solely based on a "considered and reasoned" acceptance of a complainant’s testimony__.
[Underlining added]
[17] Given these principles, I move to the trial judge's reasons in the passages which, in the appellant's view, contain errors((Judgment under appeal, para. 72-73 et 113-116.)):
[TRANSLATED]
[72] In his denial of the sexual assault, his choice of words is astonishing. He said, and I quote, "[TRANSLATED] I had absolutely no involvement in that assault or anything, I have no, zero memory of anything, it is not something I would do to X".
[73] This response leaves the Court perplexed. The accused did not say that the events were made up or that they never happened. He said: "[TRANSLATED] I had absolutely no involvement in that assault".
[...]
[113] In its entirety, the testimony of [the complainant] is honest, direct and clear. It is not vindictive and it was given with the intention to provide a true and precise account.
[114] The Court finds that the testimony of [the complainant] is both credible and reliable. Additionally, the Court also finds that despite her age at the time of the events, she remembers the events well enough that her testimony is persuasive and convincing.
[115] The Court does not believe the accused's explanation and rejects it. __The Court finds that the accused's denial, in the context of the totality of the evidence, does not overcome the testimony of [the complainant] which supports the accusations against him__. Additionally, the Court finds that the accused's testimony does not raise a reasonable doubt.
[116] Finally, the Court finds that based on [the complainant]'s testimony, the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused penetrated the complainant's vagina behind the kitchen table, that he put his hands on her breasts in a changing room and that he surreptitiously watched her multiple times while she was taking showers.
[Underlining added and references removed]
[18] I note that the trial judge found the appellant's word choice surprising which left him perplexed. He focuses particularly on the words "[TRANSLATED] I had absolutely no involvement in that assault". The trial judge explains his perplexity arose from the fact that "the accused did not say that the events were made up or that they never happened". For the rest, the trial judge found that the appellant's denial "[TRANSLATED] in the context of the totality of the evidence, does not overcome the testimony of [the complainant]"((Judgment under appeal, para. 115.)). However, in this case, "the totality of the evidence" was limited to the testimonies of complainant and the appellant.
[19] The Court agrees with the appellant that in coming to this conclusion, the trial judge committed reviewable errors which require appellate intervention.
[20] First, as highlighted by Proulx in //Cedras//, caution is required when criticizing the way that the person testifies((//R. c. Cedras// (1994), 1994 CanLII 5843 (QC CA), 32 C.R. (4th) 305 (C.A.), para. 12 [//Cedras//]. See also //Langlois c. R.//, 2025 QCCA 1639, para. 20.)):
[TRANSLATED]
Each human being behaves differently in moments of tension and an observer must be cautious when they criticize human behaviour. An accused who chooses to testify is not participating in a speech competition: "Justice does not descend automatically upon the best actor in the witness-box".
[References removed]
[21] Especially since in this case, the words "[TRANSLATED] I had absolutely no involvement in that assault" are not only a clear denial of the actions imputed to the appellant, but also consistent with the totality of his testimony which does not leave any ambiguity: that he denied having committed the sexual acts that he was being charged with.
[22] Second, as repeated many times, an accused has nothing to prove and does not have any burden of proof((//Kruk, supra//, note 3, para. 61.)) No one can "[TRANSLATED] require that he disprove the complainant's version to benefit from a reasonable doubt"((//Cedras, supra//, note 21, para. 33. See also //LSJPA — 2545//, 2025 QCCA 1351, para. 6.)). A judge may not also, unless the burden of proof is reversed, require that the accused comment on the truthfulness or credibility of other testimony((//R. v. Markadonis//, 1935 CanLII 44 (SCC), [1935] S.C.R. 657; //J.L. c. R.//, 2017 QCCA 398, para. 84-87.)).
[23] Therefore, the appellant did not state during his testimony that the complainant's testimony was made up or that the assault never took place((//R. v. Boyd (J.C.)//, 2005 MBCA 80 (CanLII), para. 6-7.)). By finding the contrary of the unambiguous statements((Judgment under appeal, para. 73.)), the trial judge committed an error of law. The presumption of the correct application of the law does not apply here.
[24] The prosecution invites the Court to apply //Vuradin//((R. v. Vuradin, 2013 SCC 38, para. 13.)) and conclude that the trial judge simply accepted the testimony of the complainant when the testimonies of the appellant and the complainant conflicted. This cannot be the case here since, unlike in //Vuradin//, the trial judge committed an error of law during his evaluation of the appellant's denial, impacting his reasoning on the appellant's guilt.
[25] The reversal of the burden of proof by the judge and his obvious error on the mere existence of a denial of facts by the appellant on the sexual assault had a palpable impact on the conclusion which states "[TRANSLATED] the accused's denial, in the context of the totality of the evidence, does not overcome the testimony of [the complainant] which supports the accusations against him"((Judgment under appeal, para. 115)). There are grounds for the Court to intervene.
[26] The same intervention applies to the counts of sexual touching and voyeurism since the judge's reasons do not allow us to understand why the complainant's testimony on these charges meet the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge's brief analysis of these charges are not sufficient to explain why he came to such a conclusion, even though he found that the appellant's testimony that he was never alone with the complainant during the shopping trip to be plausible.
**FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT:**
[27] **ALLOWS** the application for leave to appeal;
[28] **ALLOWS** the appeal;
[29] **REVERSES** the convictions pronounced on September 9, 2024 on counts 1 as modified, 4 and 7;
[30] **ORDERS** the holding of a new trial.
%%___________________________%% \\
MANON SAVARD, J.C.A.
%%___________________________%% \\
GUY COURNOYER, J.C.A.
%%___________________________%% \\
PETER KALICHMAN, J.C.A.
Me. Joël Girard \\
SCHNEIDER, GIRARD & ASSOCIÉS \\
For the appellant
Me. Maxime Hébrard \\
DIRECTOR OF CRIMINAL AND PENAL PROSECUTIONS \\
For the respondent
Date of hearing: March 26, 2026