Source: CanLII
Citation: R v. Vien, 2026 ONCS 110
Court File No.: CR-23-11403668-0000
Date: 2026/06/17
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
v.
JOEL VIEN
PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE P. ROGER
on October 2, 2025, in OTTAWA, Ontario
APPEARANCES:
F. Dulude - Counsel for the Crown
N. St-Pierre - Counsel for Joel Vien
THURSDAY OCTOBER 2, 2025
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ROGER, P. (Oral):
The accused, Joel Vien, is charged with one offence contrary to s. 264.1(2) of the Criminal Code, uttering a threat to cause the death of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.
The events of this case go back to May 14, 2023, take place in an Ottawa bar and involve two individuals who did not know each other beforehand. The accused said to the other individual, Mr. Stevenson, in English, that he had Prime Minister Trudeau “in his gun sights” and that “one day, I'll pull the trigger”.
Mr. Vien also told Mr. Stevenson that he would have a prime minister's death on his conscience and that if he missed, the RCMP would ensure that he was executed for the attempt.
In a criminal trial, the burden is always on the Crown to prove the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. To be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt requires certainty that the offence was committed. That an offence was likely committed is not sufficient.
In all trials, the evaluation of the credibility and reliability of witnesses is important. This trial is no exception.
The accused called evidence in this trial, thus the R. v. W.(D.) analysis is applicable albeit only up until the third stage, since the accused did not testify and the defence's evidence on its own could not lead to a conclusion of innocence nor could it raise a reasonable doubt. I must evaluate whether the Crown has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt by evaluating the evidence in its totality.
S. 264.1 of the Criminal Code, which provides for an offence for uttering threats, was well-explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. McRae, 2013 SCC 68 (CanLII), 2013 3 SCR 931. The prohibited act, uttering a threat to cause death, is made out if a reasonable person fully aware of the circumstances in which the words were uttered or conveyed would have perceived them to be a threat of death or bodily harm. Witnesses' opinions, in this case Mr. Stevenson's, are relevant but not conclusive to determine the perception of a reasonable person. The element of fault is proven if the threatening words were uttered to intimidate or to be taken seriously. The fault element is subjective and what matters is what the accused actually intended. However, the decision about what the accused actually intended may depend on inferences drawn from all of the circumstances.
When I consider the evidence in its totality, I find a reasonable doubt, thus I must find the accused not guilty.
First, on the prohibited act, I have a reasonable doubt as to whether the words that Mr. Stevenson remembered were words that Mr. Vien actually uttered. Additionally, even if Mr. Vien uttered those words, I have a reasonable doubt as to whether a reasonable person would perceive, in the circumstances, the words as a threat of death.
Mr. Stevenson was a witness who was very defensive of his words and his positions. He frequently refused to admit facts that ought to have been admitted from the start. His evidence on his degree of intoxication is an example. Mr. Stevenson also refused to admit any errors in his evidence and in his chronology of events. I accept that certain subjects where he was contradicted under cross-examination were of a periphery nature but it is exactly these types of facts that Mr. Stevenson ought to have admitted, which leaves me uncertain on the rest of his evidence. Additionally, Mr. Stevenson was frequently argumentative with defence counsel, endlessly explaining his theories on a wide array of topics. In its entirety, it would be risky to accept Mr. Stevenson's evidence, leaving me with a reasonable doubt on what Mr. Vien said. Indeed, Mr. Stevenson was shown to be apt to exaggerate or embellish events and he refused to admit any possibility that he did so on less-important details. In a case of threats, small changes to the words which were said or not said can change a lot. I thus have a reasonable doubt as to what Mr. Vien said.
The reasons set out above would suffice but I would also add in the alternative that I have a reasonable doubt as to whether a reasonable person would have perceived Mr. Vien's words as how Mr. Stevenson related them, a death threat. The evidence indicates that Mr. Vien was intoxicated, that he was agitated and that he argued heavily for his political and social views. However, the evidence also indicates that Mr. Vien was more or less, which is possibly an anglicism,1) more or less an open book, that he identified himself to Mr. Stevenson by showing his firearms license, that he sent Mr. Stevenson a Facebook message and that he gave Mr. Stevenson a huge before leaving him. I thus have a reasonable doubt as to whether a reasonable person would have perceived the words attributed to Mr. Vien as a threat. I find that it is more likely that the words in question would have been perceived as an exaggeration uttered by a frustrated individual who spoke in strong language about things that frustrate him.
Additionally, or in the alternative, I also have a reasonable doubt on the element of fault. The evidence points to the conclusion that Mr. Vien did not have the intention that his words be taken seriously and rather he meant the opposite. I admit that the words in question are exact and that they were uttered by someone who lives close to the prime minister's residence and has access to firearms. However, these words were uttered in the context of a long conversation where the participants often disagreed. In this context, the evidence instead points to the conclusion that he was trying to convince his recalcitrant conversation partner of the merits of his numerous political and social views. I do not doubt that Mr. Stevenson perceived a threat, and it is a factor that I considered both in the actus reus and in intention, but I place little weight on Mr. Stevenson's perception given my conclusion on his credibility and reliability and in consideration of the totality of the circumstances that night.
Consequently, I find the accused not guilty of the offence charged.